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Abstract
Why are trade barriers often used to protect home producers, even at the cost of
introducing deadweight losses from higher commodity prices? We add an informational
friction to the standard textbook argument in favor of free trade, and show that trade
restrictions may be a more eﬃcient policy than a lump sum transfer to the displaced
producers. Trade barriers, while generating deadweight losses, have the beneﬁt that
they do not generate a need for compensation. When the policy maker does not know
the amount that should be transferred, the risk of over-compensating may make trade
barrier more eﬃcient.
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Ray Riezman, and Narayana Kocherlakota for helpful comments.Why are trade barriers often used to protect home producers, even at the cost of intro-
ducing deadweight losses from higher commodity prices? According to a standard textbook
argument in favor of free trade, in order to maintain the welfare of the home producers at
the pre-trade level, a combination free trade and a lump sum transfer to displaced home
producers is a more eﬃcient policy than trade barriers. The reason is that trade barriers
imply higher commodity prices, which cause deadweight losses for the consumers. This
paper shows that this argument hinges on the assumption that the policy maker has com-
plete information about the losses suﬀered by the displaced home producers. We relax this
assumption and show that trade barriers can be the informationally eﬃcient policy instead.
We add the informational friction to focus on the informational problem associated with
implementing the textbook “winners compensate losers” argument. Seemingly ineﬃcient
trade barriers arise only as the optimal response to the information constraints. The policy
has an interesting form: the losers choose between a ﬁxed transfer (which can be interpreted
as a workers assistance program) and the trade barrier.
Our explanation relies on the intuition that trade barriers, while ineﬃcient, have the
beneﬁt that they do not generate a need for compensation. When the policy maker does
not know the amount that should be transferred, there is a risk of over-compensating.
Compensating with a transfer is expensive because it induces losers to over-report their
losses in order to receive a higher transfer.
There have been several attempts to explain the apparent contradiction between the
textbook free trade argument and the empirical fact that trade is, for the large part, not
free. We believe this paper provides a novel explanation to the puzzle (see Section 1).
We introduce in Section 2 a very stark model. Consumers in a small open economy ben-
eﬁt from trade through lower world prices. Home producers may lose from being displaced;
this loss is simply a parameter, meant to embody the various ways in which displacement
may be costly. We do not model explicitly the nature of competition, since we are inter-
ested only in constructing a particular set of outcomes and comparing them to the complete
information optimal policy, which, by textbook logic, corresponds to free trade. In an at-
tempt to make the results as strong as possible we assume that the foreign good is always
cheaper than the domestic good, and that the diﬀerence is larger than the loss suﬀered
by the displaced home producers. Therefore, under complete information, the consumer
would always choose to consume the foreign good and compensate the home producer with
a transfer. By doing so, we are intending to make it as diﬃcult as possible to get trade
barriers to arise. We do not model the aggregation of consumer’s preferences and assume
that a representative consumer dictates the trade policy. We also do not model the reasons
1why the consumers want to protect the domestic producers, because it is not the focus of
this paper; instead, we assume that a policy must be chosen subject to keeping the home
producers at least as well oﬀ as they are in autarchy.
In Section 3 we present ﬁrst the problem under the assumption that the consumer
can buy one indivisible unit of the good either from the home producer or from a foreign
producer. The consumer solves a mechanism design problem, with the constraint that the
home producer should be kept as well oﬀ as he would be when he produces the good. In
this problem, the home producers report the displacement loss they would suﬀer under
free trade, and the consumer pre-commits to a policy as a function of the report. The
optimal policy has two regions, one where a trade barrier is enacted, and another where a
constant transfer is made. The home producer chooses whichever region she prefers. One
can think of this as a policy where the government oﬀers either a trade barrier or a “trade
assistance program” for displaced producers, and the producers chooses one or the other.
The basic intuition for the result is that whenever the policy maker chooses a transfer to a
producer reporting a given displacement loss, it must also transfer the same amount to all
producers reporting a lower displacement loss, or these would have an incentive to misreport.
This implies that the consumer sometimes pays in excess of the actual displacement losses.
Whenever such overpayment is larger than the deadweight loss deriving from the trade
barrier, a cash transfer is not the information-constrained optimal policy. Hence, there will
be a threshold compensation level: if the protected producer requests a compensation at or
below that level, it will receive a compensation equal to the threshold. Higher requests will
be compensated by introducing trade barriers.
We generalize the result in two ways. First, in the mechanism design problem the
consumer has the ability to commit to a policy as a function of the home producer’s report
of displacement loss. The problem is that once the loss is revealed, the consumer prefers
to use this information to target the amount of the transfer and avoid the deadweight loss
associated with using the trade barrier. In Section 4 we undertake an equilibrium approach
and characterize the equilibrium outcomes in the asymmetric information case when there is
no commitment. While the model displays a large number of equilibria, the characterization
of the outcome is the same as in the commitment case. In these equilibria essentially two
signals are used, “a high signal”, sent from ﬁrms with a “high” displacement loss, and a
“low signal”, sent by ﬁrms with lower displacement loss. The policy maker chooses trade
protection when the protected producer sends a high signal and gives transfers whenever
the producer reports a low signal. Such transfer must be equal to the highest displacement
loss of those reporting the low signal (otherwise if the transfer is lower those with higher
2loss send the high signals that guarantees the trade protection). From the policy maker’s
point of view it may be better use the trade barrier and pay the deadweight loss rather
than choose to send a transfer to every producer sending a low signal.
Secondly, in Section 5 we extend the model to allow for partial protection by allowing the
amount the consumer chooses to consume from home producers to vary continuously. We
show that partial protection may be the optimal policy. The solution involves consuming
more of the home good (i.e. more protection) than would be chosen under complete infor-
mation. In order to decentralize such an outcome in the case of many identical consumers,
this implies that it would be essential to impose a barrier to trade.
1 Alternative explanations and related literature
The literature oﬀers various answers to the question “why is international trade not free”.
We cannot discuss here all contributions, most of which are surveyed by Rodrick (1995).
Our paper is related to explanations relying on diﬀerent forms of incomplete information.
This section explains how we oﬀer a novel approach relative to this subset of the literature.
Feenstra and Lewis (1991), for example, suggest that transfers may be costly because
of diﬃculties involved in identifying the identity of the winners and losers from trade.1 In
their model, the biggest loser from free trade gets no rent at the optimal policy, while the
biggest winner gets the highest rent. When funds are not available from other sources to
implement the complete information optimum, the optimal policy moves away from that
optimum, imposing distortions in order to generate revenue to ﬁnance the transfer. In eﬀect,
asymmetric information is crucial because it eliminates a source of lump-sum transfers.
We view our explanation as complementary to this. We assume that the winners from
the trade policy can both be identiﬁed and their gains quantiﬁed, so that it is easy under
complete information to generate the transfers implied by the textbook free trade argu-
ment. The diﬃculty in our story is that compensation through cash transfer generates an
information rent, and that rent distorts the optimal policy away from such transfers. We
think both stories contribute to our understanding of why seemingly ineﬃcient trade bar-
riers exits. Our notion that payment through transfers generates scope for rents for those
that receive transfers seems in accord with intuition; however, we do not deny that there
might also be distortions in raising the funds that we do not incorporate.
One advantage of our structure is that our results hold independently from the rest
1More precisely, this explanation requires uncertainty about the identity of who wins the most and who
loses the least.
3of the taxation structure. Because Feenstra and Lewis study a distortion in the source of
funds, they rely on the fact that another source of less distortive revenue is not available, or
is not available in suﬃcient quantity. If one thought of embedding their model into a world
where other sources of funds were available, but at a cost, the marginal distortion from
trade barriers can only be as large as that of the least distortive tax instrument available.
In our framework instead, there is no restriction on how distortive trade barriers might be
relative to other forms of taxation.
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)’s explanation is also based on uncertainty about who wins
and loses from an eﬃciency enhancing reform. Their insight is that when the population is
divided between a subset of certain winners, and a subset of people who may win or lose,
if the expected gain in the latter subset is negative, they all vote against the reform. With
perfect information about who is going to win or lose instead, the winners would vote in
favor, and their vote might be enough to tilt the outcome in favor of the reform. Our paper
however applies also to cases where identity of the winners and losers is certain to all.
Coate and Morris (1995), while not concerned directly with trade policy, show that
whenever the eﬃciency of a project (in our case, trade protection) is uncertain to the
electorate, politicians concerned of maintaining a “good” reputation may shy away from
direct cash transfers. “Bad” politicians, favoring policies that transfer resources to the
special interest, may choose to implement the project even when the cash transfer would be
more eﬃcient in order not to reveal their type. Hence, uncertainty about both the eﬃciency
of the policy (policy uncertainty) and about the objectives of the politician (politician
uncertainty) are needed. In such equilibria bad politicians adopt the ineﬃcient policy as
a disguised transfer mechanism, in order to maintain their reputation and be re-elected.
Citizens re-elect them because they don’t know if the policy is ineﬃcient or not. Rodrik
(1995) argues that these models might be useful for explaining seemingly ineﬃcient trade
policies. However, he also points out that the sort of trade policies we consider in this
paper are hardly justiﬁable on the same grounds as in Coate and Morris, because for their
argument to hold, trade barriers need to be eﬃcient in some states of the world that are
not observed by citizens. In our paper instead, we consider an environment where, under
complete information, a cash transfer is always the preferred policy (using Coate and Morris’
language, we do not have neither policy nor politician’s uncertainty).
Several authors2 have studied trade barriers in a political-economy framework, showing
that barriers can arise in some circumstances. Our results diﬀer from these in that the use
2See for example Brainard and Verdier (1997), Davidson, et al. (2004), Grossman and Helpman (1994),
Mayer (1984), Mayer and Riezman (1987), Magee (2003), and Mitra (2001)
4of trade barriers is only the response to a constrained-Pareto problem. We do not rely on
any special political environment or distribution across voters to get barriers to arise.
Our characterization of the result under the commitment case parallels the result in
Townsend (1979), which considers optimal insurance in an exchange economy with costly
state veriﬁcation and random endowments. In the optimal contract, monitoring is used
when there is a low realization of the random variable, while no veriﬁcation is used when
the realization is high. In our framework bad news correspond to displaced industries
suﬀering a high loss, and if this is the case, monitoring takes the form of a trade barrier.
The cost of monitoring is the deadweight loss induced by the policy.3
The spirit of our paper is similar to a long line of papers, including work such as Baron
and Myerson (1982), showing that asymmetric information can lead to an important tension
between eﬃciency and division of surplus. Here, ineﬃcient policies are adopted to avoid
over-transferring resources to the home producer. If the producer were simply transferred
the highest possible displacement loss, an eﬃcient allocation could always be attained, but
at high cost to the consumers.
2 The Model and the Outcome under Complete Information
There is a representative consumer who has an inelastic demand for one unit of a product.
There are two producers of the good, home and foreign. Buying from the foreign producer
generates a loss to the home producers of l per unit bought from the foreign producers, but
creates a beneﬁt b > l for the consumer per unit consumed. Later, we will assume that
l is not known to the consumer. Note that we are intentionally vague about the source
of beneﬁts and losses b and l; we want to emphasize that our results are not crucially
dependant on a particular source of the gains from trade, so long as some portion of the
losses from trade are not known to the winners.
Consumers, the potential winners from trade, choose the trade policy and are concerned
about the potential welfare losses incurred by home producers displaced by free trade. We
do not model directly this concern, but instead assume that they choose a policy that makes
them as well oﬀ as possible, subject to the restriction that they keep the home producers’
welfare at the level enjoyed under autarchy.4 This restriction parallels the implicit assump-
3This form of solution has been shown to be optimal in the context of monitoring criminal activities, for
example see Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Reinganum and Wilde (1985).
4One interpretation is that the consumer is trying to ﬁnd a way to move from a current policy of complete
barriers (autarky) to one where some trade might be used, but must ﬁnd a way that is Pareto improving. We
do not focus on initial conditions as our goal is simply to show that barriers can arise as a Pareto optimum.
5tions used in the argument that with free trade winners can compensate losers, and still
have enough left over to be better oﬀ.
Assume, as a benchmark, the consumers know the displacement loss l. In this case the
textbook justiﬁcation of free trade applies: the consumer would transfer l dollars to the
home producer and buy the product from the foreign producer. Crucial to our theory is
therefore that l is not observed by the consumer. One can imagine many examples where l
might not be known to the consumer. For instance, the home producer might be unable to
productively provide any other service, and will therefore be unemployed if the consumer
uses the foreign producer. In this case, the home producer loses income if the consumer
chooses the foreign producer, but gains leisure. The lost income might be easy to measure,
but the gained leisure is not, which motivates the incomplete information assumption that
we analyze. On the other hand, the home producer may have to start producing something
diﬀerent when the consumer chooses the foreign producer. While the new income might be
easy to measure, all of the costs including potentially important psychological costs, moving
costs (monetary and otherwise), and retraining costs, as well as the cost of switching to a
less preferred job, might be hard to ascertain.
We model the set of policies the consumer can choose from as follows. First, the con-
sumer can choose a protection level m ∈ [0,1], which is the minimum fraction of the good
that must be purchased from the home producer. There is no direct interpretation of m,
except that it tells us which producer the consumer buys from. However, we think that
m = 1 is naturally interpreted as a trade barrier. In a decentralized world with many iden-
tical consumers, without a trade barrier, a single consumer concerned for the welfare of the
home producer cannot signiﬁcantly aﬀect the aggregate well being of the home producers.
Hence, she would have no incentive to buy the home produced good if the foreign produced
good was available; she could free-ride oﬀ of other people’s actions to determine the well
being of the home producers. To implement m = 1, there would have to be a coordination
device that could take the form of a government-imposed barrier to trade. Since we focus on
the case of inelastic demand for a single unit, the model also does not distinguish between
a tariﬀ that forces domestic production and a complete import restriction.
Secondly, the consumer can make a lump sum transfer t to the producer. This transfer
can be interpreted as a governmental assistance program for the home producers, ﬁnanced
from lump-sum taxation; a natural interpretation of t might be worker retraining compen-
sation, or a ﬁxed level of compensation for industries hit by foreign competition. Again,
with many consumers, no individual consumer would have a private incentive to make a
payment to the home producers, hence a government would have to take action.
63 The Mechanism Design Problem
For the remainder of the paper, we drop the assumption that the consumer knows the
displacement loss l; the consumer knows only that l is drawn from some cumulative distri-
bution F(l) with support [l,l] ≡ L. We assume also that F(l) is diﬀerentiable and therefore
has an associated density function f(l). We consider the extreme case where ¯ l < b, in other
words, we assume no policy uncertainty: under complete information, the consumer would
always choose free trade and a transfer t = l. The assumption is meant to make trade
barriers as hard to achieve as possible at an optimum.5
We ask what policy should the consumer use to guarantee that the home producer is
always at least as well of as he is when there is no competition from the foreign producer.
We calculate optimal policies by formulating the problem as a mechanism design problem.
The home producer reports a displacement loss b l from which the consumer chooses a
transfer t(b l) and trade protection m(b l) ∈ {0,1}, where m = 1 corresponds to buying from
the home producer and m = 0 corresponds to buying from the foreign producer. In this
section we focus on the simple case where the consumer has linear utility. Because of
this linearity, the restriction to buying from one producer or the other is without loss of
generality. In Section 5 we add curvature to the problem and consider m ∈ [0,1].
We use the revelation principle to focus on truth telling mechanisms. In order for
the consumer to guarantee that the home producer is no worse oﬀ than if he produces
(m(l) = 1), it must be the case that, for any l, t(l) ≥ (1 − m(l))l, in other words either
trade protection (m(l) = 1), in which case the transfer can be set to zero (t(l) = 0), or no
protection and a transfer covering the loss: (m(l) = 0 and t(l) ≥ l). We consider the case
where the consumer chooses transfer and protection without randomization.6
The indirect utility of the consumer as a function of the policy is therefore:
u(t,m) = (1 − m)b − t
For the 1 − m units imported, the consumer beneﬁts by b. The consumer also must pay t
as a transfer to the home producer.
For a given report of b l, the home producer suﬀers the displacement loss

1 − m(b l)

l





= t(b l) −

1 − m(b l)

l (1)
5In Appendix B we consider the case b < l.
6For the preferences we consider, there is no loss of generality in this restriction to pure choices.
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Figure 1: The optimal policy





subject to: l = argmax
b l
Rl(t(b l),m(b l)) (3)
t(l) ≥ (1 − m(l))l , for all l (4)
Constraint (3) is the truth-telling constraint. Constraint (4) guarantees that the home
producers are always at least as well oﬀ as they would be in autarchy. The following
proposition characterizes the optimal policy.
Proposition 1 The optimal policy takes the form
t(l) = ¯ t, m(l) = 0, l ≤ ¯ t
t(l) = 0,m(l) = 1, l > ¯ t
, ¯ t ∈ L (5)
The proof is in Appendix A. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal policy. Producers with
losses less than ¯ t are compensated through a transfer of ¯ t. Note that the transfer is constant
in that range: if the consumer chooses to compensate any producer with a transfer, she
must transfer the same amount to all producers being compensated with a transfer. If the
transfer was not constant, the home producers receiving a lower transfer would misreport
to get the largest possible transfer.7 Hence, the amount to be transferred must be equal to
the largest loss among the producers that are being compensated with a transfer.
7If the populace had a noisy signal of l, the rule could include a transfer increasing in l. This however
would not aﬀect our main conclusion that some producers may be compensated with trade restrictions.
8Therefore, for high cost reports, it might be better to choose m(l) = 1, that is, to impose
a trade barrier on foreign producers. Although this generates a deadweight loss, funding by
transfer may be more costly because it implies larger overpayments to low cost producers.
Notice that, for producers with l ∈ (l,¯ t), the compensation more than covers the loss,
and they are strictly better oﬀ than under autarchy (no compensation and m(l) = 1). One
can view this as an information rent.
To see the trade oﬀ more clearly, we use Proposition (1) and rewrite the problem as the
choice of the threshold ¯ t
max
¯ t
F(¯ t)(b − ¯ t) + (1 − F(¯ t)) · 0
When l is below ¯ t (which occurs with probability F(¯ t)), consumers must pay ¯ t to compensate
the home producers, but gain b. Above ¯ t, consumers compensate the home producers with
a trade barrier, gaining neither b nor paying t.
The ﬁrst order condition for ¯ t is8
f(¯ t)(b − ¯ t) = F(¯ t) (6)
The left hand side reﬂects the marginal beneﬁt from increasing ¯ t: the consumer obtains the
beneﬁt b from buying the foreign good, less the transfer. On the other hand, this increases
the payment that must make to all producers reporting below ¯ t; this payment is made with
probability F(¯ t). The right hand side, then, is the marginal cost of increasing ¯ t.
To see the way in which trade barriers are used, take F to be the uniform distribution on
[l,l]. Then the solution is ¯ t = max{(b + l)/2,l}. In other words, if the loss from consuming
the home good is big enough (b > 2l − l), home producers are always compensated with
a transfer of ¯ l. When b ∈ (l,2l − l) using the home producer is always ineﬃcient, in the
sense that the loss of b from consuming the home good is always greater than the producer’s
loss from not producing, but the optimal mechanism prescribes that the consumer should
purchase the home good for high enough reports of l. Hence, trade barriers can be an
optimal policy under incomplete information about the costs to the losers from trade. As
we noted earlier, under complete information, m = 0 and t = l; incomplete information is
the only factor driving the result that trade barriers might be used.
Since the mechanism is incentive compatible, it is as if the consumer gave the home
producers the choice of whether they would like transfer ¯ t or a trade barrier. Despite the
extremely stark nature of the model, the outcome, then, generates simple policies that
roughly mirror what is observed.
8We are for this calculation assuming that f
0(¯ t)(l − ¯ t) − 2f(¯ t) < 0, so that the problem is concave.
94 Equilibrium Trade Barriers Without Commitment
The optimum studied in the previous section has the feature (shared with any typical
mechanism design problem) that the consumer can commit to actions as a function of the
report b l. Conditional on receiving a truthful report, the consumer would always, ex post,
prefer to use the transfer of t(b l) = b l, set m(b l) = 0, and transfer exactly the amount that
makes the home producer as well oﬀ as if he were producing. In this section we consider
the case where the consumer cannot commit to the announced policies. We show that trade
barriers (m = 1) may be used even in a pure “signalling” environment where there can be
communication between the consumer and the home producer, but the consumer cannot
commit to any speciﬁed policy.
In the environment we have in mind, after nature’s choice of l ∈ L the home producer can
make an announcement σ ∈ S, where S has the same dimensionality as L. The strategy of
the home producer speciﬁes an announcement as a function of its type σ(l). The consumer’s
strategy is speciﬁed by functions m(σ), t(σ) indicating respectively whether or not the
trade restrictions are imposed and the amount of the cash transfers to be made after each
announcement. We focus on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in pure strategies as a solution
concept, but it is straightforward to extend our analysis to mixed strategies.
Naturally, the signaling game may display many equilibria. The following proposition
establishes a property of the policy implied by all equilibrium outcomes: the policy takes
a form similar to the one in the mechanism design problem, that is, transfers to low cost
types and trade barrier to high cost types.
Proposition 2 All pure strategy equilibria of the signalling game imply the following policy:
(t ◦ σ)(l) = ¯ t, (m ◦ σ)(l) = 0 if l ≤ ¯ t
(t ◦ σ)(l) = 0, (m ◦ σ)(l) = 1 if l > ¯ t
, ¯ t ∈ L
Each equilibrium has one of two forms. First, it may be a separating equilibrium where
signals are used in equilibrium by diﬀerent sets of types and trade barriers are used in
correspondence to the signal sent by the higher cost types. On the other hand, if ¯ t = l, it
may be a trivial pooling equilibria where the home producer is transferred l regardless of
the signal.
A natural question is how the optimal policy diﬀers when commitment power is removed.
The following proposition states that if it is not optimal to “separate” in the mechanism
design problem, then there cannot be a separating equilibrium in the signalling game, since
10the equilibrium of the signalling game is always incentive compatible, and therefore could
be implemented by the consumer in the mechanism design problem.
Proposition 3 Suppose the unique solution to the mechanism design problem is a constant
transfer to all types. Then any equilibrium of the signalling game has a constant transfer
to all types.
This fact implies that the set of models where trade barriers may arise under the signaling
game is (weakly) a subset of the set of models where trade barriers can arise as an optimal
mechanism. However, for a given model where a separating equilibrium exists, trade barriers
may be used for a larger set of costs than in the commitment case. That is, it may be the
case that the mechanism assigns a transfer to some low cost types and a trade barriers to
others, but for the same underlying parameters the equilibrium of the signaling game either
does not separate at all, or uses trade barriers more or less frequently (that is, for a larger
or smaller subset of l), as compared to the mechanism.
5 Degrees of Protection
Our simple model did not embody the notion that consumers could choose fractional shares
from each of the two producers. The linear utility considered in Section 3 implies that
there the solution to m(l) is always at a corner. In this section, we extend the model to
allow for the possibility that the citizen might prefer only partial protection of the domestic
producer.










where g is a positive, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, decreasing, convex function with
g(0) = 1 and g(1) = 0. Convexity implies that, as the market share of the home producer
is reduced, the burden on the home producer becomes greater and greater. This embodies
the idea that it may be low cost to reduce output of home producers by a little (because
of factors that can easily ﬂow to new uses), but that some factors may be very costly to
switch to other uses. The previous sections consider the special case where g(m) = 1 − m.
Complete information. As in the last section, we study ﬁrst the complete information
case as the benchmark of what would occur under textbook assumptions. In this case, it
may be optimal for the consumer to purchase a fraction of the product at home simply
11because of the convexity of the producers’ loss, even under complete information. The
consumer chooses policies mc(l) and tc(l) that solve, for each l,
max
mc(l),tc(l)
b(1 − mc(l)) − tc(l)
subject to tc(l) = lg (mc(l))
Whenever interior, the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to mc(l) are:
− b − lg0(mc) = 0, m ∈ (0,1) (7)
−b − lg0(mc) ≥ 0, m = 1 (8)
−b − lg0(mc) ≤ 0, m = 0 (9)
and it can be veriﬁed that mc is increasing in l. As in the previous section, we interpret mc
as the amount of free trade, since producers would be willing to pay (through, for instance,
lower prices) to get at least this much market share.
Incomplete information. Consider now the incomplete information case. The mech-
anism design problem for the consumer is notationally unchanged compared to problem (2),
save the allowance that m can now vary on the interval [0,1]. To construct the optimal policy
we note that the producer with the lowest rent will be the one with loss l since any other pro-













= 0 and incentive compatibility guarantees that all types l get
at least zero utility (the amount they get with m(l) = 1 and t(l) = 0, i.e. complete trade
protection and no transfer).
Next we characterize m and t. First we derive the following intermediate result: since
producers with higher l value m more highly, any incentive compatible mechanism must
have m increasing in l
Lemma 1 Any m satisfying l = argmaxb l Rl(t(b l),m(b l)) has m(b l) is increasing in l
The proof is in the appendix. For any m(l) that is increasing, deﬁne














As l falls, Rl(t(l),m(l)) rises at rate g(m(l)) due to the typical sort of information rent.
Note that the information rent is decreasing in m(l). This is the beneﬁt to m that can make
it optimal to have m(l) > 0, unlike the complete information case.












subject to m(l) increasing
For any increasing function m(l), we choose t(l) as in (10) so that incentive compatibility
is satisﬁed and Rl(t(l),m(l)) = 0.
Disregarding the constraint that m be increasing for a moment, the solution to the
maximization m(l) solves
− b − lg0(m) − F(l)g0(m) = 0, m ∈ (0,1) (12)
−b − lg0(m) − F(l)g0(m) ≥ 0, m = 1 (13)
−b − lg0(m) − F(l)g0(m) ≤ 0, m = 0 (14)






> 0, ∀l : m(l) ∈ (0,1)
so in fact the constraint that m(l) be increasing is satisﬁed everywhere.
One way to interpret the transfer is that it is paid to any factors of production who
would have produced the units mc −m that are lost under trade. The marginal producer is
indiﬀerent between taking its share of transfer and not, whereas all others that receive the
transfer are better oﬀ, the policy is a Pareto improvement.
The proposition that follows present the main result of this section: incomplete infor-
mation always leads to a weakly higher use of home production compared to the complete
information case. In other words, there is some positive amount of trade protection embod-
ied in the optimum prescribed by the mechanism.
13Proposition 4 The optimal mechanism implies:
(a) m(l) = mc(l)
(b) For all l ∈ L, mc(l) ≤ m(l)
(c) For any l 6= l with mc(l) ∈ (0,1), mc(l) < m(l)
Under incomplete information, there is an extra beneﬁt of increasing m: the rate of
change in the information rent in (11) decreases. This extra beneﬁt leads the consumer
to make m(l) bigger than mc(l). The intuition for part (c) rests on the fact that, under
complete information, when mc(l) is interior, there is no marginal eﬀect of changing mc(l).
That means that, under incomplete information, at mc(l), the marginal eﬀect of increasing
m is only the decrease the information rent, with is a strictly positive beneﬁt.
A simple example embodies these results. Let l = 0, l = 1, b = 1, g(m) = 1 −
√
m
and F(l) = l, the uniform distribution. One can compute from (12) that m(l) = l2, and
from (7) that mc(l) = 1
4l2. In other words, for any l, there are four times as much of the
good produced at home under the mechanism relative to the complete information solution.
With probability one, l 6= l and there is trade protection, m(l) > mc(l).
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a novel explanation to the puzzle of why we observe seemingly ineﬃ-
cient trade barriers. Our explanation complements other existing explanations that rely on
incomplete information or various form of “political failure”.
When losses are unobserved, cash transfers may generate more information rents than
in kind transfers. As a result, trade barriers may be part of an optimal solution. In fact, it
may be the case that some degree of trade barriers are used for a wide variety of cases.
Because we study Pareto improvements, our results are not particular to a speciﬁc
political arrangement for policy-making. Of course, as various authors have shown (see
references in Footnote 2), political environments may inﬂuence trade outcomes. Our purpose
here is simply to show that barriers can arise from a Pareto problem, and hence may not
be as puzzling as they ﬁrst appear, nor may they require sophisticated political models to
explain them. Incorporating incomplete information aspects of compensation into political
models of policy making is an interesting avenue for future research.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let L0 = {l : m(l) = 0} and L1 = {l : m(l) = 1}
Claim 1 The transfer is constant whenever the trade barrier policy is constant, that is
t(l) = t0 for all l ∈ L0 and t(l) = t1 for all l ∈ L.
If not, then there are l,l0 ∈ Li such that t(l) < t(l0). But then the home producer with
cost l has incentive to report cost l0 to get a greater transfer and the same m
Claim 2 m(l) is increasing in l.
If either L0 or L1 is empty, the result is trivially true. If both are non-empty, then,
suppose that the claim is false. Then there exists l1 and l0 with l0 > l1 and m(l0) = 0,
m(l1) = 1. Incentive compatibility requires t0 ≥ l0, otherwise type l0 prefers the trade
barrier and therefore reports b l = l1. Incentive compatibility also requires
Rl0(t0,0) ≥ Rl0(t1,1)
Rl1(t1,1) ≥ Rl1(t0,0)
Rewriting the ﬁrst term in each inequality using (1):
Rl0(t0 − l0,1) ≥ Rl0(t1,1)
Rl1(t1 + l1,0) ≥ Rl1(t0,0)
But that implies t0−l0 ≥ t1 and t1+l1 ≥ t0, which cannot hold for l0 > l1, a contradiction.
Claim 3 t0 = t = maxl∈l0 l and t1 = 0
Constraint (4) implies t0 ≥ l for all l ∈ l0 and t1 ≥ 0. If t0 > ¯ t and t1 > 0, the consumer
can lower both t0 and t1 by the same amount, raise her payoﬀ, and maintain incentive
compatibility. If t0 = ¯ t and t1 > 0, then, for any l1 ∈ l1, Rl1(t1,1) > Rl1(0,1) > Rl1(t0,0),
since t0 < l1. As a result, the consumer can lower t1 and maintain incentive compatibility.
If t0 > ¯ t and t1 = 0, then, for any l0 ∈ l0, Rl0(t0,0) > Rl1(0,1), and, again, the consumer
can lower the transfer t0 and maintain incentive compatibility. Therefore it must be the
case that t0 = ¯ t and t1 = 0
This completely characterizes mechanism (5) in the statement of the proposition.
15A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For a signal to be a best response for the home producer of type l it must be the case that
l = argmax
b l
Rl((t ◦ σ)(b l),(m ◦ σ)(b l)) (A1)
As a result, any equilibrium must be one that is of the form that is incentive compatible
in the mechanism design problem and Claims 1-3 in the proof of proposition 1 follow im-
mediately. Since it is never optimal for the citizen to respond to a signal with both a trade
barrier and a transfer, it is also true that whenever there is a trade barrier the cash transfer
is zero (as in Claim 3 in the proof of proposition 1)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Assume by contradiction that the solution to the mechanism design problem is a transfer
t0 to all types and that there exists an equilibrium of the signalling game [e t(·), e m(·),e σ(·)]
where the consumer uses trade barriers after observing some signals, that is e m(σ) = 1 for
some σ in the range of e σ(·). Now consider the policy [t(·),m(·)] in the mechanism design
problem with :
t(l) = e t ◦ e σ(l)
m(l) = e m ◦ e σ(l)
∀l
and consider a strategy for the consumer in the signaling game [t0(·),m0(·)] that mimics the




Since in the signaling model the consumer is choosing a best reply, [e t(σ), e m(σ)] must be
weakly preferred to strategy [t0(σ),m0(σ)] for all σ. This means that [t(·),m(·)] must do at
least as well as a constant transfer of t0 from the consumer’s point of view. Moreover, home
producer equilibrium behavior (A1) implies that [t(·),m(·)] is incentive compatible. This
implies that the constant transfer cannot be the unique solution to the mechanism design
problem, a contradiction
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Take l0 > l. Incentive compatibility for l implies (t(l) − g(m(l))l) ≥ (t(l0) − g(m(l0))l). Like-
wise, incentive compatibility for l0 implies (t(l0) − g(m(l0))l0) ≥ (t(l) − g(m(l))l0). Summing,
16we get










−g(m(l))l − g(m(l0))l0 ≥ −g(m(l0))l − g(m(l))l0
g(m(l))l0 − g(m(l))l ≥ g(m(l0))l0 − g(m(l0))l
g(m(l)) ≥ g(m(l0))
Since g is decreasing, m must be increasing for this to hold
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
(a) Since F(l) = 0, the optimality equations are identical for the two problems..
(b) If l = l or m(l) = 1 or mc(l) = 0, there is nothing to prove. So suppose m(l) < 1
and mc(l) > 0 for l > l. Then, from (12) and (14):
−b − lg0(m(l)) − F(l)g0(m(l)) ≤ 0
and, from (7) and (8),
−b − lg0(mc(l)) ≥ 0
But F(l) > 0 and g0 < 0, so
−b − lg0(m(l)) ≤ 0 ≤ −b − lg0(mc(l))
and so g0(m(l)) ≥ g0(mc(l)), which implies that m(l) ≥ mc(l).
(c) From (b), we know mc(l) ≤ m(l). Suppose equality holds for l ∈ (0,1), they from
(7) and (12) we derive −b−lg0(mc(l)) = 0 = −b−lg0(m(l))−F(l)g0(m(l)). But since g0 < 0,
this cannot hold for l 6= l, since F(l) > 0
B Appendix: the case where b < l
When b < l, there are two regions. For l ∈ [l,b], the optimal policy for the consumer
under complete information would be to use consumer the foreign good and transfer l to
the home producer. For l ∈ [b,l], the consumer would rather consume the home good
than consume the foreign good and make the transfer (at l, consumer is indiﬀerent between
the two policies). This corresponds, for the home producers, to a range of absolute and
comparative disadvantage ([l,b]) and a range or absolute disadvantage but comparative
advantage ([b,l]).
A simple implication of (6) is the following.
17Proposition 5 If ¯ t > 0, then ¯ t < b
One incentive compatible policy, that also makes the home producer at least as well
oﬀ as when he produces, is to set ¯ t = b. Note that, under this policy, the consumer gains
exactly nothing relative to the case where he always consumes the home good, since he gives
away the entire gain b whenever he chooses free trade. The proposition, however, shows us
that the consumer can do something even better: the optimal policy has ¯ t < b, so that some
cases in the range (¯ t,b), incomplete information makes the consumer move from consuming
the foreign good to consuming the home good. In other words, we observe trade barrier for
these values of l.
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